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Recent scholarship has uncovered convincing evidence of systematic donor influence in 
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank.  Less clear is how donors 
influence IFI decisions.  Possible avenues are formal and informal:  formal influence through 
official decisions of the board of executive directors and informal influence over decisions not 
made at the board level.  This paper explores the role of informal influence at the World Bank by 
examining the flow of funds after loans are approved.  Controlling for commitments (loan 
approvals), are subsequent disbursements linked to the geopolitical interests of important donors?  
Since the board of executive directors is formally involved in loan approval but not in 
disbursement decisions, this provides an interesting case to identify the avenues of influence.  The 
results indicate the scope of reforms needed to bolster the independence of the World Bank. 
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I. Introduction 
There is a well-established literature investigating donor influence in international 
financial institutions (IFIs).  Many scholars focus on the IMF (e.g., Andersen, Harr and Tarp, 
2006; Barro and Lee, 2005; Dreher et al., 2009b; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Stone, 2002, 2004; 
Thacker, 1999) but studies of the political economy of IFI lending cover other institutions as well, 
including the World Bank.  For example, Dreher et al. (2009a) find that the number of World Bank 
projects approved is higher when the borrowing country is a rotating member of the UN Security 
Council than when the country is not, ceteris paribus.  Andersen, Hansen and Markussen (2006) 
uncover a positive link between alignment with the U.S. on UN votes designated as important by 
the U.S. State Department on the one hand, and IDA commitments on the other.  The systematic 
influence of donors in IFI lending decisions appears well established through such econometric 
analyses. 
Somewhat less well studied are the formal and informal pathways through which donors 
exert influence in IFIs.  In the case of the IMF, Stone (2004) provides a convincing story regarding 
program interruptions.  When countries fail to meet lending conditions, Fund staff members 
suspend programs, apparently with little regard to geopolitics.  The board of executive directors 
then reviews cases to see if the program should be reinstated.  Stone finds that reinstatements 
happen more expeditiously for geopolitically important countries.  This work provides evidence of 
formal influence as board decisions appear to reflect the interests of powerful countries.  Dreher et 
al. (2009a) suggest two routes at the World Bank.  First, staff may anticipate donor preferences 
and bring forward more project proposals for favored countries (i.e., informal influence).  Second, 
the board may simply act more quickly on such projects (formal influence). 
In general, studies of loan decisions (e.g., using commitment data) reflect the combined 3 
                                                
effect of formal and informal influence but cannot distinguish between them, fundamentally 
because the details of executive board decisions are not public record.  It is possible, however, to 
assess informal influence in other settings.  For example, Kilby (2009a) looks at disbursements of 
World Bank adjustment loans, controlling for commitments.
1  That study finds that World Bank 
structural adjustment loan disbursements are less dependent on macroeconomic performance in 
countries aligned with the United States.  Because the decision to release a loan tranche is not 
officially made by the board, this presents evidence of informal U.S. influence over Bank 
operations. 
Apart from that study, previous work on the World Bank has examined behavior that at 
least in part reflects formal influence.  This is clear for studies based on commitment data which 
directly reflect loan approval decisions made by the board (e.g., Andersen, Hansen and 
Markussen, 2006) but it also applies to most studies using disbursement data since the level of 
disbursements depends on the level of prior commitments.  For example, Fleck and Kilby (2006) 
find a link between U.S. interests and World Bank disbursements.  This link could be driven, at 
least in part, by the role U.S. interests play in the formal process of loan approval by the board.  
The U.S. executive director could vote for and lobby other countries to support loans that further 
U.S. interests.  Such efforts would result in more commitments which in turn result in more 
disbursements in subsequent years. 
 
1Aid agencies and governments typically commit funds before they disburse them.  In the 
case of the World Bank, commitments are IDA credit amounts and IBRD loan amounts approved 
by the Board of Directors.  These are counted in full at the time the Board approves the loan/credit.  
Disbursements are counted at the time the World Bank actually pays out funds, e.g., when a 
program loan tranche is released or a project expense reimbursed.  For program loans, 
disbursements usually happen over a one to three year period after loan approval (but longer delays 
are possible); for project loans, a six year disbursement profile is typical.  Committed amounts may 
not fully disburse if loan conditions are not fully satisfied, a project is completed under budget, the 
project/program is cancelled, or the loan is cancelled. 4 
This paper looks at World Bank disbursements after controlling for prior commitments.  If 
donor influence over the flow of funds is largely confined to board approval of projects and thus 
commitments, subsequent geopolitical events (UN voting, military alignments, etc.) should have 
no influence on the flow of these already committed funds from the Bank to the borrower.  
Following this logic, proxies for donor interests should prove insignificant in a regression with 
World Bank disbursements as the dependent variable and the commitments from which these 
funds are disbursed as a control variable.  In this scenario, Bank staff make disbursement decisions 
free from donor pressure.  Alternatively, donor influence could extend more deeply so that donor 
priorities influence disbursement decisions over which the donor has no formal control.  Kilby 
(2009a) finds patterns consistent with U.S. influence in disbursement decisions for the case of 
World Bank adjustment lending; the question is whether donor operational influence is more 
widespread. 
Understanding how donors influence IFI decisions, whether via formal channels, informal 
channels, or both, is critical for successful institutional reform.  If donor influence is largely 
formal, governance reform at the board level is the appropriate solution.  But changing the 
governance structure (e.g., voting shares, majority requirements, etc.) may be a much less potent 
approach if donors have significant informal influence.  In this case, the key factors may be the 
location of the institution, hiring and promotion practices, information disclosure, and linking 
performance to pay in the appropriate fashion.  The location of the Bretton Woods institutions just 
blocks from the White House clearly facilitates informal U.S. control of the institution.  A lot has 
been written about hiring and promotion practices and the dominance of U.S.-educated 5 
                                                
professionals within the Bank.
2  These characteristics insure the U.S. government good access to 
information regardless of official disclosure policies so that World Bank disclosure restrictions 
merely hinder others from providing a check to U.S. informal influence.  With pay and promotions 
not closely tied to project outcomes, Bank staff have little incentive to resist informal pressures 
that may reduce project performance. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II develops a framework for 
examining the influence of donors on post-approval allocation decisions.  Section III presents and 
describes the data used in the analysis.  Section IV discusses the estimation procedure and results.  
Section V is a brief conclusion. 
 
II. Model 
I start by examining the World Bank's allocation of funds at the project or program level.  I 
divide the opportunities for donors to influence World Bank allocation decisions into two periods:  
up through loan approval and post-approval.  Up through loan approval, donors may accelerate the 
process and expand loan size when they wish to use access to World Bank funds to reward 
countries.  Conversely, donors may slow the process and reduce loan size when they wish to limit 
access to World Bank funds to punish countries.  At this stage, donor influence can be exercised 
through formal or informal channels.  After loan approval, donors may pressure the Bank to 
disburse funds expeditiously, ignoring potential problems (corruption, lack of counterpart funding, 
failure to reach benchmarks).  Alternatively, donors may pressure the Bank to disburse slowly (or 
even suspend disbursements) when the project or program is more or less on track, potentially 
 
2On the World Bank see, for example, French (1994), Gwin (1997), Stern and Ferreira 
(1997) or Woods (2003).  More extensive work on similar issues in the IMF can be found in 
Chwieroth (2007). 6 
                                                
creating implementation problems.  Post-approval influence is informal only. 
I introduce the following notation to describe projects.  Let j index all World Bank-funded 
projects (across all recipient countries i and time periods t).  At loan approval, the World Bank 
commits cij to country i for project j.
3  While the loan is "active" (after loan approval but before 
loan closing), the World Bank disburses a variable amount dijt to country i for project j in year t.  
Define Ait as the set of active projects in recipient country i in year t.  If j ó Ait (project j is not 
active), then dijt = 0; if j 0 Ait (project j is active), then dijt $ 0. 
Actual disbursements (dijt) may differ from planned disbursements (    
  ) if the 
project/program does not go according to the plan laid out in the Staff Appraisal Report and loan 
documents or if changing donor interests lead to pressure to accelerate or slow disbursement.  
Planned disbursements will depend on the commitment amount, characteristics of the 
project/program, and country characteristics.  We can incorporate these considerations by 
modeling the ratio of actual to planned disbursements as a function of these variables: 
    /    
            ,     ,       (1) 
where Xijt is a vector of "technical" factors that influence the speed of disbursement, DIit is a vector 
of donor interest variables that may reflect donor pressure on the World Bank regarding 
disbursements to country i, and εijt is a stochastic element.  I define X such that higher values 
correspond to technical factors that speed disbursement and DI such that higher values correspond 
to greater (more intense positive) donor interest.  One possible form of this function which proves 
convenient from an econometric standpoint is: 
    /    
                          (2) 
 
3Although the subscript i is redundant given that j indexes all projects (across all countries 
and time periods), it is helpful for tracking other variables. 7 
                                                
where β1>0 for appropriately defined X.  The hypothesis that donors influence disbursement rates 
is equivalent to β2>0 for appropriately defined DI while the alternative hypothesis that donors do 
not infl e d m s i 2= aking logs of both sides and rearranging yields  uenc isburse ent rate mplies β 0.  T
                 
                        (3)     
Data on planned disbursements (    
  ) are not systematically available but data on 
commitments (cij) are.  Recall that cij is the amount committed by the World Bank to country i for 
project j in whatever year that project was approved (i.e., the original World Bank loan amount for 
project j).  Assuming a standard disbursement profile by project type and "age" (years since the 
project was approved),     
   is proportional to cij once we control for project type (e.g., with a 
sector dummy variable) and age.
4  Incorporating the appropriate control variables in Xijt, the 
equatio co n be mes: 
                                          (4) 
Data on actual disbursements from the OECD DAC are available only at the country level 
(      ∑            ), not at the project level (dijt).
5  In addition, other than project and aid type, few 
project-level factors (Xijt) are available.  I address these issues by shifting to country-level analysis, 
summing over all active pr ear t (i.e, summing over  j 0 Ait):  ojects in country i in y
                                         (5) 
I refer to the country-level commitment variable cit as "Original Commitments" to distinguish it 
 
4This does not assume that loans are designed to disburse in the year they are approved; 
rather planned disbursement could extend over several years.  This contrasts with the link assumed 
between commitments and disbursements in BulíÍ and Hamann (2003, 2007), Celasun and 
Walliser (2008), and Odedokun (2003). 
5Although PLAID provides project level data, disbursement data are available only as 
cumulative totals, not on a yearly basis by project. 8 
                                                
from new commitments approved by the board in year t.  Original Commitments are defined as the 
sum of World Bank commitments to country i for all projects still active in year t:        ∑           .  
Thus, cit reflects the portfolio of originally committed funds for active projects from which current 
disbursements could be drawn (the country's loan portfolio).
6  Xit is a vector of technical country 
characteristics that may influence disbursement.  It also includes variables describing the loan 
portfolio for country i in year t:  sectoral count variables (constructed by adding project-level 
sectoral dummy variables) and average project age (for active projects, weighted by loan size (cij 
/cit)). 
There are a number of possible donor interest variables.  Much of the IFI literature uses 
UN-related measures but even here there are many choices.  Using donor-recipient alignment on 
all UN General Assembly (UNGA) votes may be appropriate if UN voting proxies for broader 
alliances or commonality of interests (Stone 2004).  Following Thacker (1999), one could focus 
just on UNGA votes designated as important by the U.S. State Department.  Andersen, Harr and 
Tarp (2006) advocate a swing voter model based on a narrowly rational view of voting where 
outcomes reflect vote buying.
7  They argue that votes on "unimportant" measures (ones the U.S. 
does not designate important and on which the U.S. does not lobby intensively) reflect a country's 
true preferences, free of U.S. influence.  A country's alignment with the U.S. on these votes reflects 
the country's ideal location in the voting space.   Conversely, votes on important measures do 
reflect U.S. influence or concessions to the U.S. position.  Thus, payments to a country for its 
 
6In practice, I limit the "active life" of a project to 8 years because very little disbursement 
is likely to happen after this point even if World Bank staff have not officially closed the project.  
This limit also allows for cases where the closing date is missing, either because of incomplete 
data or projects that had not yet closed by 2009. 
7I use the term "narrowly rational" because vote buying is the outcome of a rational actor 
model that considers only the vote at hand, not strategic voting, vote trading or broader issues. 9 
                                                
concessions to the U.S. should be related to the difference between the country's alignment with 
the U.S. on important votes and its alignment with the U.S. on unimportant votes.  This is 
consistent with a swing voter model where alignment on unimportant votes reflects the voter's 
bliss point.  Kilby (2009b) evaluates these competing approaches empirically using World Bank 
lending data and finds considerable support for a swing voter formulation.
8 
In the present analysis, I use diffUS, defined as a country's alignment with the U.S. on 
important UN votes minus the country's alignment with the U.S. on unimportant UN votes, as a 
geopolitical measure.  One problem in interpreting coefficient estimates based on diffUS is the 
possible correlation between U.S. votes in the UN and the votes of other influential countries.  
Without other appropriate controls, the estimated coefficient for diffUS could reflect the combined 
influence of these countries.  In the present context, this is important for understanding which 
donors have influence but not for the larger question of whether donors exercise informal 
influence.  Nonetheless, I introduce an additional variable, diffG7, the difference between a 
country's alignment with the other G7 countries (excluding the U.S.) on important and 
unimportant UN votes.  The designation of UN votes as important is as before, reflecting the U.S. 
State Department's assessment (the only one systematically available).  This is the correct 
approach to isolate U.S. influence though the resulting estimated coefficient for G7diff need not 
reflect the true influence of the other G7 countries as they may view different UN votes as 
 
8Most UN votes are not close and the U.S. often loses even those votes it considers 
important.  This can be consistent with a vote buying model if the U.S. values support regardless of 
the outcome.  For example, in the case of the UNSC, Dreher et al. (2009b) argue that the U.S. 
values being closer to consensus so that it rewards swing voters even when their votes are not 
required to win (for example, "No" votes where the U.S. could simply exercise its veto).  
Conversely, in UNGA voting, the U.S. designates as important some votes where the U.S. has the 
support of only two or three other countries. 10 




The data used in this analysis are described in Table 1.  Variables include aid flows (from 
the World Bank and various bilateral donors), recipient country economic and political 
characteristics, UN voting alignments, and military aid.  The unit of observation is the recipient 
country/year.  The sample is determined by data availability.  Important UN voting data start in 
1983 while DAC data on aid flows end with 2007.  Given the lag structure used, this restricts the 
sample to 1984 to 2007.  Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for two samples, first the 
eligibility/selection equation sample that includes cases where no funds were disbursed (2822 
observations on 141 countries with an average 20 observations per country) and second, the 
allocation equation sample that excludes those cases (2613 observations on 141 countries with an 
average of 19 observations per country).
10 
Data come from a number of sources.  Disbursement variables are based on total official 
gross disbursements from the International Development Statistics CD-ROM (OECD, 
 
9Because other donors do not systematically report which UN votes they consider to be 
important, one cannot construct other variables conceptually parallel to the U.S. variable.  This 
data limitation means that this test allows us to either reject or fail to reject the narrower hypothesis 
of U.S. informal influence individually.  But on the basis of these data, we cannot reject the 
broader hypothesis of donor influence (U.S. or otherwise). 
10I set the sample for each equation based on the most restrictive specification so that the 
sample size is constant for any given equation.  Results are the same without this restriction.  I also 
limit the sample to countries that are members of the World Bank in the applicable year; 
information on their year of entry ("signing date"), exit ("withdrawal date") and re-entry ("return 
date") comes from the World Bank web site.  Thus, the selection equation does not include 
selection into or out of Bank membership.  The disbursement rate equations (that include Original 
Commitments as an independent variableBTables 2 and 3 plus Columns 1 and 4 of Table 4) also 
restrict the sample to cases where Original Commitments are positive, i.e., where disbursements 
are possible. 11 
                                                
2006-2009).
11 
I take World Bank commitment data from the World Bank Projects Database (World Bank 
2009a) because the OECD reports commitments only for official development assistance (ODA) 
and the interest rate on IBRD loans is not concessional enough for these loans to qualify as ODA.  
Constructing Original Commitments and related variables (portfolio age and sectoral variables) 
also require the project/program level data provided in the Projects Database rather than the 
country level data in the IDS.  GDP and population data are from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2009b) with missing values imputed using Penn World Tables data 
(Heston et al., 2002, 2006).  Recipient country political/governance indicators are derived from 
Freedom House indices (Freedom House, 2009) and Polity IV scores (Polity IV Project, 2009).  
Conflict data from PRIO cover through 2008 (Gleditsch et al., 2002).  U.S. military aid data are 
from U.S. Agency for International Development's Greenbook (USAID, 2009). 
Data on UN voting come from several sources.  Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009) provide 
data on all UNGA regular session resolutions passed by roll call vote.  The State Department also 
designates other roll call votes as importantBvotes on defeated amendments, votes on motions, 
votes on paragraphs or language of proposed amendments, etc.  I collected data for these other 
votes from the State Department's annual report to Congress (U.S. State Department, 
 
11I use older IDS CD-ROM data to fill-in missing values in new data, effectively 
recovering countries dropped from OECD coverage (especially from 2007 on).  This is necessary 
because IDS data are not historical in the sense that the DAC "updates" its data to the current 
situation.  For example, when two countries unite, the two country time series are combined into 
one and henceforth only available in the combined format even over the period before the 
countries united.  When a country splinters, DAC data are divided accordingly, again even back 
through the period when only one country existed.  When a country is dropped from DAC 
coverage (e.g., in 2007 when CEECs/NICs were dropped as no longer "developing"), the historical 
data for those countries disappear. 12 
                                                
1984-2009).
12 
  [Table 1 (A and B) about here] 
Table 1A reports descriptive statistics for the eligibility equation variables and sample, 
Table 1B for the allocation equation.  As nearly 93 percent of the observations have positive World 
Bank disbursements (WB Eligible), reported values are similar across the two samples.  When 
World Bank disbursements (WB disbursements) are positive, they average $183 million with a 
maximum of $4 billion (Ghana 2006).
13  Original Commitments (Original Commitments) average 
$1.1 billion with a maximum of $22 billion (India 1992).  The portfolio-weighted age (Age) 
averages 4 years, close to the middle of the possible 1 to 9 range.
14  The number of active 
"development policy lending" operations (the designation for Structural Adjustment Programs in 
 
12I collected State Department data at the vote level rather than aggregated to the country 
level so that measures can be constructed for the other G7 countries.  Early State Department 
reports have some limitations (not distinguishing between abstentions and absences, 
inconsistencies between different tables).  Where possible, I used original documents reproduced 
in these reports rather than the report tables generated from those documents.  However, 
discrepancies were minimal. 
13Results reports are not sensitive to excluding this observation, an IDA disbursement that 
is about 10 times Ghana's typical disbursement level in this period.  Other observations in excess 
of $3 billion in disbursements are: 1990BMexico; 1997BKorea; 1998BKorea; 2006BEthiopia, 
Tanzania, Uganda.  Mexico and Korea are IBRD disbursements during financial crises.  The 2006 
disbursements are IDA credits associated with the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) 
resulting from the 2005 G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland.  Results reported are not sensitive to 
excluding these observations, underscoring the utility of a log specification. 
14I allow Age to run from 1 (commitments in the current year) to 9 (commitments made 8 
years ago).  I start counting at 1 rather than 0 to give a non-zero weight to current commitments in 
the calculation of this weighted average.  Mathematically, 
              1          
     
 
   
              
     
 
   
     
where cij(t-s) are new commitments to country i for project j in period t!s, i.e., loan amounts for 
projects approved in year t!s. 13 
                                                
the World Bank Projects DatabaseBSAL count) averages a bit over 1 with a maximum of 13 (Côte 
d'Ivoire, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, various year).  The number of active projects (excluding 
technical assistance projectsBProject count) averages 13 with a maximum of 122 (China 2000).  
The number of technical assistance projects (TA count) averages a bit over 1 with a maximum of 
17 (Vietnam 2005).  The dummy variable Blend equals 1 for countries that have access to both 
IDA and IBRD funds (i.e., Original Commitments greater than zero in both categories), a situation 
that applies to 14 percent of the country/years in the sample. 
The remaining variables describe country characteristics, including measures of U.S. and 
G7 geopolitical interests in the country.  Population averages 37.6 million, ranging from 40,130 
people (St. Kitts and Nevis 1998) to 1.3 billion (China 2007).  GDP per capita averages $4,000 in 
2000 PPP dollars, running from $392 (Tanzania 1986) to $20,984 (Czech Republic 2007).  
Freedom House is the average of the civil liberties and political rights indices, inverted so that 1 
indicates least free and 7 indicates most free with an average of 4.  The Polity IV autocracy to 
democracy index (Polity) averages just under 2, running from most autocratic (!10) to most 
democratic (+10).
15  The variable War is a dummy indicating whether the country is involved in a 
major conflict with at least 1000 war-related deaths in that year, the case in almost six percent of 
the sample. 
The variable diffUS is the difference between a borrowing country's alignment with the 
U.S. on important UN votes and its alignment with the U.S. on "unimportant" UN votes; diffG7 is 
the equivalent measure for alignment with the other G7 countries.  The voting alignment 
 
15This variable is "Polity 2" which has interpolated values during periods of government 
transition.  In cases where the polity index is not available but all other data are, I impute a polity 
index based on the separate values of Freedom House's political rights and civil liberties indices.  
The estimated coefficients on Polity and Freedom House do not change substantially if I do not use 
this procedure. 14 
calculation is the same as in Kilby (2006, 2009a, 2009b) and closely follows Thacker (1999) and 
Dreher and Jensen (2007).  For each vote, a country scores a 1 if it follows the U.S., a 0.5 if it 
abstains or is absent when the U.S. votes (or vice versa), and a 0 if it opposes the U.S.  For the G7 
score, this process is repeated with each of the 6 other G7 countries.  A country's alignment is its 
mean score for the year on either important or unimportant votes (averaged either over scores with 
the U.S. or over scores with the other G7 countries). 
The values of diffUS and diffG7 are lagged one year since UN votes happen predominantly 
in the last quarter of the calendar year.  There is some small variation in the average values of these 
variables across the two samples.  In the eligibility sample, diffUS averages 0.1585, with a 
minimum of !0.364 (Afghanistan 2002) and a maximum of 0.787 (Zambia 1985).  In the 
allocation sample the diffUS average is slightly higher at 0.163.  The G7 equivalent, diffG7, 
averages 0.0126 in the larger sample with a minimum of !0.4414 (Hungary 1985) and a maximum 
of 0.3524 (Guatemala 1989).  In the smaller allocation sample, the mean is again slightly higher at 
0.0144. 
Another possible geopolitical indicator is military aid.  The presumption is that the U.S. 
only gives substantial military aid to allies it seeks to support.  US miliary aid is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the country received a non-trivial amount of aid from the U.S. that year 
(defined as more than a half million dollars), true for 39% of the sample.  Data on military aid are 
not systematically available for other G7 countries. 
Following similar logic, I include bilateral economic aid as a possible measure of 
geopolitical interests.  However, bilateral aid could also proxy for need factors not already 
included in the equations (i.e., beyond population, GDP per capita and governance) and 
complicate interpretation of the estimated coefficients.  To mitigate this possibility, I also include 15 
                                                
aid from the "like-minded" donors, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.  
These countries are known for their relatively humanitarian aid practices but they wield relatively 
little power within the World Bank.
16  The eligibility equation includes dummy variables 
indicating positive levels of U.S., G7, and like-minded donor bilateral economic aid.  The 
allocation equation includes the continuous version of these variables, that is the level of aid 
disbursements.
17  All bilateral aid variables are lagged one year to mitigate the possibility of 
endogeneity, for example, cases where bilateral donors follow the World Bank's lead.  
Eighty-seven percent of the observations in the larger eligibility sample are cases where countries 
receive economic aid from the U.S. (US eligible); the average annual amount for US 
disbursements in the smaller allocation sample is about $80 million, $90 million if we exclude 
cases with no U.S. aid.  The highest level of U.S. aid is $7.8 billion (Egypt 1991).
18  More than 98 
percent of the eligibility observations have positive G7 bilateral economic aid (G7 eligible) with 
 
16See Fleck and Kilby (2006) for more discussion. 
17To avoid log of zero and thereby shrinking the sample, I add 0.01 to each bilateral aid 
value before taking logs.  This figure ($10,000 or !4.065 in log terms) is the lowest positive 
disbursement level reported in the raw data.  In the raw data, there are 270 cases with no U.S. 
bilateral aid, 4 cases with no bilateral aid from any of the other G7 countries, and 54 cases with no 
bilateral aid from any of the like-minded donors.  Results are not sensitive to the choice of the 
"trivial" value.  Alternatively, using binary variables throughout for bilateral aid gives roughly the 
same results for UN variables as reported in the tables below. 
18This anomalous amount includes Egyptian military debt forgiven by the U.S. following 
Egypt's support in the first Gulf War.  At this time, Japan was emerging as the largest aid donor.  In 
a related move, the OECD DAC temporarily changed its rules to allow write-offs of military aid 
loans to count toward individual donor's development assistance totals, mainly benefitting the U.S.  
(Raffer, 1998).  The next largest figure is $4.8 billion for Panama in 1999, again driven by flexible 
definitions of aid (this time related to the handover of the canal zone).  Next is $3.7 billion for 
Poland in 1991 and $2.7 billion for Egypt in 1988.  Note that Israel is excluded from the sample 
because it did not borrow from the World Bank during this period.  These anomalous cases again 
underscore the merits of a log specification. 16 
                                                
an average of $300 million dollars (G7 disbursements) in the allocation sample.
19  The largest 
value for G7 aid is $11.3 billion to Nigeria in 2006, part of a wide-ranging debt write-down deal.  
Ninety-six percent of the observations in the eligibility sample are cases with positive like-minded 
donor aid (LM eligible); the average level (LM disbursements) in the allocation sample is $50 
million.  The largest value of LM disbursements is $1 billion for Russia in 1993. 
 
IV.  Estimation and Results 
We can think of the World Bank disbursement decision as happening in two steps.  First, 
World Bank staff decide whether a country is eligible for disbursements.  Second, if the country is 
eligible, the staff decide how much to disburse.  To allow for this approach, I estimate a two part 
model with separately estimated selection/eligibility and conditional allocation equations.
20  This 
has the limitation that interpretation of the allocation equation is conditional on selectionBunless 
we are willing to assume the error terms in the two equations are independent.  However, it also 
has certain benefits relative to alternative estimation techniques.  A Type I Tobit, for example, 
requires the same process for selection and allocation, an assumption that we will see does not hold 
well in this case.  In addition, that approach would rule out use of country fixed effects.  The 
number of countries (N) is greater than the number of time periods (T) so consistent estimation of 
country fixed effects is not possible for estimators that cannot be transformed to eliminate the 
country fixed effects.  A Type II Tobit (Heckman Selection Model) has similar limitations.  There 
 
19Because there are so few cases with no G7 aid, I also estimated the eligibility equation 
with the continuous variable, ln G7 disbursements.  As one would expect, this variable enters even 
more strongly.  Otherwise, estimation results are similar. 
20A two part model is simply separate estimation of a selection equation (here via probit 
with clustered standard errors) and an allocation equation (via least squares with country fixed 
effects).  For more on the two part model, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005: 544-546, 680-681). 17 
                                                
are no theory-based exclusion restrictions for the selection equation so identification would rest 
either on ad hoc, empirically based exclusions or the nonlinearities of the probit function.  In 
addition, introducing fixed effects in this context (say, through a conditional logit as the selection 
equation) would cause the 77 countries that always get funding to drop from the sample (since 
their country fixed effect would perfectly predict the selection outcome), reducing the sample by 
more than half and likely introducing an even more severe selection problem.
21 
 
Is there informal influence? 
Table 2 presents results of probit estimation of the selection/eligibility equation using the 
full sample described in Table 1A.  The estimated equation fits the form of Equation (5) above 
(particularly from Column 2 on).  The dependent variable (WB eligible) is equal to one if the 
country received any World Bank disbursements that year.  The reported t-statistics are based on 
standard errors allowing for clustering by country.  The first column, excluding Original 
Commitments, is primarily a baseline for comparison.  Countries that have access to both IDA and 
IBRD funds are significantly more likely to receive disbursements; the estimated effect of blend 
status is a 3 percentage point increase in the probability of receiving aid.  The predicted probability 
of receiving disbursements also increases with country size while it decreases with per capita 
income, both outcomes one would expect from a need-based eligibility system.  Freer, more 
democratic countries are not significantly more likely to receive disbursements (individually or 
 
21I also estimate Heckman Selection Models following the specifications in Tables 2 and 3 
(Columns 2-4) but with regional dummies rather than country fixed effects.  This improves 
identification because I use bilateral aid variables as dummies in the selection equation and as 
continuous variables in the allocation equation.  The estimate yields results very similar to those 
reported in Tables 2 and 3.  Furthermore, Likelihood Ratio tests fail to reject the hypothesis of 
independent error terms (p = 0.8710, p = 0.9437, p = 0.9500), i.e., the hypothesis that the two part 
model is correct. 18 
jointly) and although an on-going war is associated with a lower probability of receiving aid, this 
link is also not statistically significant. 
The UN voting variable, however, is significant.  Countries making concessions to the U.S. 
on important UN votes are significantly more likely to receive funding from the World Bank.  
Moving from the lowest value to the highest value of diffUS increases the estimated probability by 
25 percentage points, a larger impact than moving between the extremes of population (14 
percentage point change) or GDP (18 percentage point change).  In this baseline, however, diffUS 
captures both pre- and post-loan approval U.S. influence (conditional on positive Original 
Commitments) so we cannot yet interpret this as evidence of informal influence. 
  [Table 2 about here] 
Column 2 of Table 2 introduces controls for the commitment portfolio (ln Original 
Commitments plus portfolio age and composition variables).  As one would expect, the Original 
Commitments variable enters with a positive and significant coefficient indicating that countries 
with larger active portfolios are more likely to receive disbursements from the World Bank.  
Increasing ln Original Commitments from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation 
above the mean results in six percentage point increase in the predicted probability of 
disbursement.  Going from the lowest value of Original Commitments in the estimation sample to 
the highest results in an 80 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of disbursement.  
The age profile of commitments enters the equation non-linearly with predicted probability of 
disbursement first increasing up to four years, then decreasing.  Going from the age profile with 
the highest predicted probability (four years) to that with the lowest predicted probability (nine 
years) lowers the predicted probability of disbursement by 22 percentage points.  Of the other 
portfolio composition variables, only the number of technical assistance projects (TA_count) 19 
                                                
enters with a statistically significant estimated coefficient in the selection equation.  Starting from 
the sample mean, one additional technical assistance project increases the predicted probability of 
disbursement by half a percentage point.  Going from no technical assistance projects to 17 (the 
sample maximum) increases the predicted probability of disbursement by two percentage points. 
With commitment portfolio controls included, we now can interpret the estimated 
coefficients on other variables as plausibly measuring the impact of post-approval events.  As 
expected, this leads to some substantial changes in the estimated coefficients.  Conditioning on 
their commitment portfolio, blend countries are not significantly more likely to receive 
disbursements than countries whose loan portfolios do not contain a mix of IDA credits and IBRD 
loans.  The estimated coefficient for population reverses sign so that, conditional on their (larger) 
commitment portfolio, larger countries are less likely to receive disbursements.  Poorer countries 
are still more likely to receive disbursements though the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is 
reduced by half. 
Finally, the diffUS coefficient now can be interpreted as measuring U.S. influence after 
loan approval, i.e., informal influence only.  As one would expect, the estimated impact is 
somewhat smaller but remains positive and statistically significant.  Again going from the lowest 
value to the highest value of diffUS, the estimated probability of disbursement increases by 6.5 
percentage points. 
Column 3 of Table 2 introduces other measures of U.S. interestsBU.S. military and 
economic aid.
22  This broader array of U.S. interests should more fully capture the impact of U.S. 
influence.  As explained above, I also introduce a parallel economic aid variable for the 
 
22I also investigated trade variables but found no statistically significant links in either the 
selection or allocation equations for this time period. 20 
                                                
like-minded donors to reduce the possibility that the U.S. bilateral aid variable is proxying for 
need.
23  In this specification, all aid variables are indicators:  US military aid equals one if the 
country received significant U.S. military aid that year; US eligible equals one if the country 
received U.S. economy aid that year; and  LM eligible equals one if the country received economic 
aid from any of the like-minded donors that year.  As it turns out, U.S. military aid never enters as 
significant in these post-loan approval estimates.  However, when countries receive U.S. economic 
aid they are significantly more likely to receive World Bank disbursements, ceteris paribus.  
Receiving U.S. economic aid (also measured by disbursements) corresponds to a 2 percentage 
point jump in the predicted probability of World Bank disbursements.  Taking the U.S. interest 
variables as a group, going from least U.S. interest (diffUS=!0.364, US eligible=0) to greatest U.S. 
interest (diffUS=0.787, US eligible=1) increases the predicted probability of disbursement by 11.5 
percentage points. 
The final column of Table 2 introduces donor influence variables for the other G7 countries 
collectively to get a better sense of whose influence we are measuring.  By including these 
variables, we can see what portion of the measured influence is actually due to U.S. informal 
pressure, rather than just proxying for broader correlated G7 informal influence.  In the case of UN 
voting, the outcome is clear: the estimated coefficient for diffUS continues to be positive, 
statistically significant and of the same magnitude while the estimated coefficient for diffG7 is 
negative and insignificant.  Measuring influence via bilateral aid, both U.S. and G7 variables enter 
with positive and significant estimated coefficients. 
Table 3 presents results for the allocation equation, estimated with country fixed effects.  
 
23Note that the impact of introducing LM eligible is fully consistent with it capturing need 
factors: the estimated coefficient on ln GDP per capita falls in size and significance.  Also, the 
estimated coefficient on US eligible is 15 percent larger if LM eligible is not included. 21 
                                                
Country fixed effects allow for time-invariant, country-specific factors that influence the level of 
disbursements (Column 1) or the rate of disbursement (Columns 2-4) and therefore reduce the 
potential for omitted variables bias.
24  The structure of the table is the same as for Table 2 but 
dependent variable is the log of World Bank disbursements (as in Equation (5)), the sample is 
restricted to cases with positive disbursements, and the results should be interpreted as conditional 
on selection unless we make additional assumptions.
25  Also, I use continuous variables for 
bilateral aid though results do not depend greatly on this. 
  [Table 3 about here] 
Column 1 of Table 3 again presents a baseline without commitment portfolio controls.  The 
significant estimated coefficient for Blend indicates countries that receive disbursements get 
significantly more than their normal level when they have both IDA and IBRD commitments.  
That population and GDP per capita are not statistically significant in this fixed effects 
specification is unsurprising since these variables generally are slow moving.  In contrast to their 
role in the eligibility equation, both the Freedom House and the Polity indices are significant.  
When a country is more free than its norm, it receives significantly more disbursements when 
eligible.  Conversely, when a country is more democratic than its norm, it receives significantly 
fewer disbursements when eligible.  Here, the implied ceteris paribus assumption is crucial as the 
estimated coefficient for Polity becomes positive (though insignificant) if Freedom House is 
 
24Strictly speaking, to interpret Columns 2-4 as reflecting the disbursement rate, the 
coefficient on ln Original Commitments must be equal to 1 (as in Equation (5)).  The results 
consistently fail to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on ln Original Commitments is equal to 
1 and actually setting the coefficient equal to one has very little impact.  For ease of exposition, I 
refer to the allocation equation dependent variable as the disbursement rate in all specifications 
that include ln Original Commitments. 
25See, however, the earlier footnote reporting Likelihood Ratio tests that fail to reject 
independence for similar models. 22 
                                                
omitted.  Disbursements are significantly below normal when a country is engaged in a major 
conflict, an outcome that could reflect difficult operating conditions, government priorities, or 
World Bank concerns about aid effectiveness.  The UN voting variable enters with a large and 
significant positive coefficient.  When they get disbursements, countries get greater-than-usual 
disbursements if they made greater-than-usual concessions to the U.S. in UN voting, ceteris 
paribus. 
Column 2 of Table 3 includes the commitment portfolio controls.  As one would expect, 
the amount of Original Commitments has tremendous explanatory power for disbursements.  In 
keeping with Equation (5), the estimated coefficient for ln Original Commitments is not 
significantly different from 1; this is true across all allocation equations in which it is included.  
The disbursement rate peaks when Age reaches 2.5 years and portfolios with more Structural 
Adjustment Loans disburse more quickly, ceteris paribus.
26 
The remaining coefficients are reduced in magnitude but with signs and significance as 
before.  The exceptions are the Blend and War dummies.  The disbursement rate is not 
significantly faster for countries that can draw on both IDA and IBRD resources and not 
significantly slower in conflict situations.  The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on diffUS is 
reduced by nearly two thirds but remains positive and significant, evidence consistent with U.S. 
informal influence after loan approval.  An increase in diffUS from one standard deviation below 
to one standard deviation above the sample mean increases predicted disbursements from $38 
 
26As one might expect, the critical difference is between no SALs and some SALs since 
whether an adjustment program is packaged as one economy-wide program or several 
simultaneous sectoral programs depends mostly on internal World Bank politics (i.e., introducing 
SECALs as "something new" when initial SALs fail to improve macroeconomic performance).  
The coefficients on other variables are the same whether I use a dichotomous or count variable so 
I leave the count version in for symmetry with the other categories (where count variables are 
appropriate). 23 
                                                
million to $44 million (15%).  An increase in diffUS from its sample minimum to its sample 
maximum corresponds to an increase in predicted disbursements from $34 million to $53 million 
(55%).
27 
The specifications in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 parallel those in Table 2.  The estimated 
coefficient for diffUS changes little from Column 2, remaining positive and statistically 
significant.  Of the other variables introduced, only ln LM disbursements (bilateral aid from 
like-minded donors intended to proxy for need) enters with a statistically significant estimated 
coefficient.  The other U.S. interest variables are not statistically significant in Column 3; this 
persists even if diffUS is dropped (even if country fixed effects are omitted).  In Column 4, the G7 
interest variables also prove statistically insignificant. 
Taken collectively, these results provide convincing evidence of informal U.S. influence in 
the World Bank after loan approval.  That influence is reflected in the significance of a UN voting 
measure that is consistent with a vote buying model.  In short, countries are more likely to have 
their World Bank loans disbursed and disbursed quickly if they make concessions to the U.S. on 
UN votes that matter to the U.S. 
 
Comparing influence before and after loan approval 
How important is post-approval, informal influence compared to the influence donors exert 
within the World Bank up through loan approval?  Table 4 presents a series of estimations to shed 
some light on this question.  These estimates differ in terms of the specification, the sample and the 
dependent variable.  Columns 1 to 3 are selection equations, Columns 4 to 6 allocation equations.  
The first column in each group (Columns 1 and 4) repeats the final specifications in Tables 2 and 3 
 
27The sample mean of ln WB disbursements is 3.722 in log terms or $41 million in level 
terms, substantially below the sample mean without logs ($183 million). 24 
                                                
but does not report the commitment portfolio variables as these variables are excluded from the 
other specifications in Table 4. To keep the table manageable, I re-label bilateral aid variables so 
that, for example, US aid indicates the dummy variable US eligible in Columns 1 to 3 and the 
continuous variable ln US disbursements in Columns 4 to 6.
28 
Column 1 of Table 4 is the disbursement eligibility equation that includes (unreported) 
commitment portfolio variables and hence is restricted to the sample where Original 
Commitments are positive.  As outlined above, this specification estimates the probability of 
disbursement conditional on commitments.  Column 2 of Table 4 has the same dependent variable 
but omits commitment portfolio variables.  In addition, the sample includes observations where the 
country was a member of the World Bank but had no active loans, i.e., no commitments that could 
have been disbursed.  Thus, this disbursement eligibility equation actually reflects a combination 
of decisionsBcurrent and past loan approval decisions and current loan disbursement conditions.  
Finally, Column 3 is the selection equation for current commitments (loan approval decisions) so 
that, in a rough sense, Column 3 may explain differences between Columns 1 and 2. 
As an example of this, consider population.  Column 1 shows that larger countries are less 
likely to receive disbursements conditional on commitments but Column 2 shows that larger 
countries are actually more likely to get disbursements overall.  The apparent contradiction is 
explained by the commitment selection equation (Column 3) which shows that larger countries are 
more likely to get commitments.  This is easiest to understand with a simple example.  Suppose 
there are 10 large countries and 10 small countries.  Since large countries are more likely to get 
loans approved (Column 3), say that 8 large countries and 4 small countries get loans approved.  
 
28For parallelism, bilateral aid variables in the commitment equations (Columns 3 and 6) 
are in terms of ODA commitments as well though this "refinement" has little impact. 25 
Since small countries with approved loans are more likely to get disbursements (Column 1), say 
that 3 of the 4 small countries get disbursements and 4 of the 8 large countries get disbursements.  
The end result is also consistent with unconditional result of Column 2; overall, the large countries 
were more likely to get disbursements (4/10 v. 3/10). 
This suggests that we can compare the sign, significance and magnitude of coefficient 
estimates across Columns 1 and 3 to understand how informal donor influence in the post-approval 
disbursement process compares with the mix of formal and informal influence in the period up 
through approval.  If these differ in kind, we can see which effect dominates in terms of its 
influence on the overall disbursement probability (Column 2). 
  [Table 4 about here] 
Looking first at UN voting, diffUS plays a similar role in the two settings, entering with a 
positive and significant coefficient in all three columns.  The magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient is highest in Column 1 (looking just at informal influence post-approval) and lowest in 
Column 3 (looking at formal and informal influence up through approval).  The voting variable for 
the other G7 is not significant in any of the three selection equations.  U.S. military aid is a 
significant covariate at the commitment stage (Column 3) but is not an important determinant of 
the conditional probability of disbursement subsequently (Column 1).  The estimated link between 
receiving U.S. economic aid and receiving World Bank funds is slightly stronger at the 
disbursement stage (Column 1) than at the commitment stage (Column 3).  Receiving G7 aid is a 
significant covariate if we look at the disbursement rate (Column 1) or the combined effect 
(Column 2) but not for commitments alone (Column 3). 
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 4 are the disbursement rate equation (conditioning on the 
commitment portfolio), the disbursement allocation equation (not conditioning on commitments), 26 
                                                
and the commitment or loan allocation equation.  As with the selection equations, the estimated 
coefficient on the U.S. UN vote variable is larger post-approval (Column 4) than it is earlier 
(Column 6).  Again, the voting variable for the other G7 countries is not significant in any of the 
three equations.  U.S. military aid is an insignificant factor across all three allocation equations.
29  
There is a significant positive link between U.S. bilateral aid and loan allocation amounts (Column 
6) that persists in disbursement levels (Column 5) but is not evident in disbursement rates (Column 
4).  The results for G7 aid are difficult to explainBmarginally significant and negatively related to 
the commitment amount (Column 6) but significant and positively related to the disbursement 
amount (Column 5).  This would make sense if the disbursement rate were particularly high but the 
coefficient estimate in Column 4 is neither large nor statistically significant. 
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that informal donor influence in the post-approval 
period is at least comparable to the combined formal/informal donor influence exercised up 
through loan approval.  This is particularly true in the case of the U.S. using access to World Bank 
funds to win concessions in UN voting. 
V. Conclusions 
Efforts to reform international financial institutions to better serve their 
efficiency-promoting goals depend critically on understanding the functioning of these institutions 
in their current forms.  Recent reform efforts focus on governance changes that may reduce the 
formal influence of the U.S. and other historically powerful nations.
30  Less reform attentionBand 
 
29Combined with the earlier results, this means that receiving significant U.S. military aid 
is associated with improved chances of getting a World Bank loan but not a significantly larger 
loan, or a significantly higher probability the loan will disburse, or significantly faster 
disbursement of that loan if it is disbursing. 
30See Lombardi (2008) for a synopsis of these efforts. 27 
less research attentionBhave been devoted to the avenues through which informal influence 
operates.  Indeed, the relative importance of formal and informal influence is not well understood.  
With such gaps in our knowledge, it is impossible to say how effective governance reform is likely 
to be in changing the actual functioning of an institution. 
This paper picks apart the avenues through which donors influence the World Bank, 
focusing on informal influence over disbursement of loans that have already been formally 
approved.  In this setting, I find quantitatively and statistically significant links between UN voting 
and World Bank disbursements, primarily reflecting U.S. informal influence.  A comparison with 
donor influence over the loan approval process suggests that informal donor influence has at least 
as much impact on the allocation of World Bank resources as formal donor influence.  This finding 
means that reform efforts should go well beyond a simple reallocation of voting shares, reaching 
deeper into the workings of the institution to change the fundamental structure of how "business 
gets done" at the World Bank.   28 
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  Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Table 1A: Eligibility Sample (2822 observations) 
 
Variable Mean  StDev  Min  Max  Description         
WB eligible  0.9259  0.2619  0  1  Receives World Bank disbursements 
Original Commitments  1,065  2,439  0.29  21,968  Sum of commitments for active projects, in millions 
Age  4.039  1.397  1  9  Average loan ages weighted by amounts 
SAL count  1.483  2.362  0  13  # active SALs 
Project count  13.04  15.36  0  122  # active projects (non-TA) 
TA count  1.441  1.797  0  17  # active Technical Assistance projects 
Blend  0.1403  0.3474  0  1  Dummy for country with IDA and IBRD Original Commitments 
Population  37.6 141.5  0.04013  1,318 Population  in  millions 
GDP per capita  4,169  3,661  391.8  20,984  PPP GDP per capita in chained 2000 $ 
Freedom House  4.044  1.786  1  7  Averaged Freedom House Rating (inverted) 
Polity  1.89 6.725  -10  10  Polity  IV  index 
War  0.05634  0.2306  0  1  Dummy indicating on-going major conflict ($1000 dead) 
diffUS  0.1585  0.1781  -0.364  0.7872  Concessions to US on UN votes important to US 
diffG7  0.01261  0.1298  -0.4414  0.3524  Concessions to other G7 on UN votes important to US 
US military aid  0.387  0.4871  0  1  Receives significant US military aid (>$500,000) 
US eligible  0.8703  0.336  0  1  Receives disbursements of US economic aid (lagged 1 year) 
G7 eligible  0.9851  0.1211  0  1  Receives disbursements of other G7 economic aid (lagged 1 year) 
LM eligible  0.9589  0.1986  0  1  Receives disbursements of Like-minded donor aid (lagged 1 year) 32 
  Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Table 1B: Allocation Sample (2613 observations) 
 
Variable Mean  StDev  Min  Max  Description           
WB disbursements  183.4  397.1  0.1  4,069  World Bank disbursements in millions 
Original Commitments  1,133  2,519  1.4  21,968  Sum of commitments for active projects, in millions 
Age  4.025  1.271  1  9  Average loan ages weighted by amounts 
SAL count  1.579  2.422  0  13  # active SALs 
Project count  13.78  15.66  0  122  # active projects (non-TA) 
TA count  1.529  1.829  0  17  # active Technical Assistance projects 
Blend  0.1481  0.3553  0  1  Dummy for country with IDA and IBRD Original Commitments 
Population  39.67 146.7  0.04013  1,318  Population  in  millions 
GDP per capita  3,903  3,273  391.8  17,709  PPP GDP per capita in chained 2000 $ 
Freedom House  4.025  1.734  1  7  Averaged Freedom House Rating (inverted) 
Polity  1.821 6.691  -10  10  Polity  IV  index 
War  0.05702  0.2319  0  1  Dummy indicating on-going major conflict ($1000 dead) 
diffUS  0.163  0.1785  -0.364  0.7872  Concessions to US on UN votes important to US 
diffG7  0.01444  0.1296  -0.4347  0.3524  Concessions to other G7 on UN votes important to US 
US military aid  0.3949  0.4889  0  1  Receives significant US military aid (>$500,000) 
US disbursements  78.54  259.7  0  7,779  US economic aid disbursements in millions (lagged 1 year) 
G7 disbursements  301.1  669.4  0  11,267  Other G7 economic aid disbursements in millions (lagged 1 year) 
LM disbursements  49.57  79.49  0  1,037  Like-minded donors aid disbursements in millions (lagged 1 year) 33 
  Table 2: Eligibility 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
        Dependent Variable: WB eligible 
ln Original Commitments    0.498** 0.520** 0.524** 
(6.68) (6.74) (6.83) 
Age    0.728** 0.732** 0.725** 
(5.22) (5.04) (5.01) 
Age
2    -0.0854** -0.0843** -0.0841** 
(-5.36) (-5.22) (-5.22) 
SAL count    0.146 0.111 0.119 
(1.62) (1.45) (1.53) 
Project count    -0.00989 -0.00931 -0.00871 
(-1.29) (-1.22) (-1.11) 
TA count    0.315** 0.282** 0.274** 
(3.30) (3.48) (3.47) 
Blend 0.511**  0.287  0.350*  0.349* 
(2.53) (1.49) (1.83) (1.81) 
ln Population  0.152**  -0.289** -0.363** -0.346** 
(4.47)  (-3.57) (-4.30) (-4.16) 
ln GDP per capita  -0.446** -0.261** -0.194*  -0.168 
(-4.21) (-2.10) (-1.71) (-1.52) 
Freedom House  0.153 0.104 0.118 0.107 
(1.47) (0.86) (0.94) (0.88) 
Polity  -0.0208 -0.0439 -0.0450 -0.0445 
(-0.81) (-1.44) (-1.38) (-1.40) 
War  -0.233  -0.0826 -0.0692 -0.113 
(-1.04) (-0.31) (-0.26) (-0.44) 
diffUS  2.164** 1.901** 1.470** 1.769** 
(4.72) (3.30) (2.57) (2.39) 
US military aid   -0.0228  -0.0267 
(-0.13) (-0.15) 
US eligible    0.653**  0.515** 
(3.53) (2.51) 
LM eligible    0.971**  0.725** 
(4.44) (3.19) 
diffG7     -0.385 
(-0.46) 
G7 eligible     0.903* 
(1.76) 
 
N  2822 2822 2822 2822 
Probit Probit Probit Probit 
t statistics in parentheses based on country clustered standard errors.  Unreported year dummies. 
* p<.1, ** p<.05   34 
  Table 3: Allocation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable:  ln WB disbursements 
ln Original Commitments    0.973** 0.963** 0.962** 
(26.48) (26.28) (26.14) 
Age    0.0697 0.0412 0.0374 
(1.14) (0.67) (0.61) 
Age
2   -0.0139**  -0.0108  -0.0104 
(-2.00) (-1.56) (-1.49) 
SAL count    0.0258** 0.0237** 0.0237** 
(2.41) (2.22) (2.22) 
Project count   -0.00462  -0.00615*  -0.00606* 
(-1.39) (-1.86) (-1.83) 
TA count   -0.00926  -0.0102  -0.0108 
(-0.80) (-0.88) (-0.93) 
Blend  0.164**  0.0346 0.0546 0.0548 
(2.08) (0.54) (0.85) (0.85) 
ln Population  0.398 0.271 0.224 0.232 
(1.22) (1.02) (0.84) (0.87) 
ln GDP per capita  -0.0928 -0.0943 -0.0917 -0.101 
(-0.71) (-0.88) (-0.85) (-0.93) 
Freedom House  0.210**  0.0790** 0.0880** 0.0884** 
(5.83) (2.68) (2.99) (3.00) 
Polity  -0.0348** -0.0189** -0.0214** -0.0215** 
(-3.94) (-2.64) (-3.00) (-3.01) 
War  -0.462**  -0.115 -0.118 -0.119 
(-4.70) (-1.44) (-1.48) (-1.49) 
diffUS  0.925** 0.386** 0.344** 0.400* 
(5.05) (2.58) (2.28) (1.78) 
US military aid   -0.0283  -0.0288 
(-0.65) (-0.66) 
ln US disbursements    0.0143  0.0132 
(1.46) (1.32) 
ln LM disbursements    0.0746**  0.0699** 
(4.54) (3.90) 
diffG7     -0.102 
(-0.38) 
ln G7 disbursements     0.0143 
(0.63) 
 
N  2613 2613 2613 2613 
FE FE FE FE 
t statistics in parentheses.  Unreported year dummies.  FE = country fixed effects 
* p<.1, ** p<.05 35 
  Table 4: Comparisons 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: WB eligible Dependent  variable:  ln WB aid 
Blend  0.349* -0.290 0.0957  0.0548 0.228**  -0.0349 
(1.81) (-1.31)  (0.60)  (0.85) (2.90) (-0.33) 
ln Population  -0.346**  0.147**  0.258**  0.232 0.496 1.166** 
(-4.16)  (3.75) (8.83)  (0.87) (1.53) (2.65) 
ln GDP per capita  -0.168 -0.390**  -0.434**  -0.101 -0.176 -0.202 
(-1.52) (-2.75) (-4.47)  (-0.93) (-1.36) (-1.14) 
Freedom House 0.107  0.244** 0.206**  0.0884**  0.211** 0.0796 
(0.88) (2.63) (3.57)  (3.00) (5.82) (1.63) 
Polity  -0.0445 -0.0301 -0.0166  -0.0215**  -0.0399**  -0.0193 
(-1.40) (-1.32) (-1.08)  (-3.01) (-4.52) (-1.63) 
War  -0.113 -0.981**  -0.702**  -0.119 -0.432**  -0.325** 
(-0.44) (-3.96) (-3.94)  (-1.49) (-4.39) (-2.49) 
diffUS  1.769** 1.571** 1.278**  0.400*  0.619** 0.245 
(2.39) (2.72) (2.82)  (1.78) (2.24) (0.61) 
diffG7  -0.385 -0.758 -0.884  -0.102 0.0363 0.0873 
(-0.46) (-1.09) (-1.58)  (-0.38) (0.11)  (0.19) 
US military aid -0.0267 0.491** 0.304**  -0.0288 0.0130  0.0510 
(-0.15) (3.51)  (2.97)  (-0.66) (0.24)  (0.70) 
US aid  0.515** 0.641** 0.340**  0.0132  0.0439**  0.0493** 
(2.51) (4.62) (2.90)  (1.32) (3.61) (2.57) 
G7 aid  0.903* 0.871**  0.117  0.0143 0.128**  -0.0930** 
(1.76) (2.23) (0.41)  (0.63) (4.72) (-3.13) 
LM aid  0.725** 0.766** 0.508**  0.0699**  0.101** 0.0285 
(3.19) (3.52) (3.40)  (3.90) (4.70) (1.14) 
 
N  2822 3369 3369  2613 2650 2044 
Probit Probit Probit  FE  FE  FE 
t statistics in parentheses, based on country clustered standard errors for (1)-(3).  Unreported year dummies. 
* p<.1, ** p<.05 
 
(1) & (4) repeat Column (4) of Tables 2 and 3 but do not report commitment and portfolio variables 
(2) & (5) also based on disbursements but exclude commitment & portfolio variables.  Sample includes cases with no Original Commitments  
(3) & (6) based on current commitments. 